PAKISTAN’S
NATIONAL CONSERVATION STRATEGY:
RENEWING
COMMITMENT TO ACTION
Report
of the Mid-Term Review
November
2000
CHAPTER
2. THE NCS REVIEW
The
NCS Review and Final Report
2.1
The NCS Mid-Term Review (NCS MTR, see Annex 1 for TOR) is intended to
enable the stakeholders (government, civil society and supporting
institutions) to take stock of the current situation and take necessary
steps for mid-course correction.fn 12
Taking stock of the NCS ideally should include: (1) both quantitative
and qualitative assessments; (2) getting a sense of what has been achieved
collectively and individually; (3) sharing experiences of what worked
and what didn’t work; (4) exchange of views and impressions through interviews
and focus groups; (5) revisiting goals and targets; and (6) seeking renewal
of commitments. Much of this work was accomplished over a year-long process
involving people within Pakistan.
2.2
An External Review Team (ERT) comprised of Pakistani and international
members (Annex 2) came in at the late stages to assess the findings and
to prepare the report. The review was not an easy task given the decade-long
period since the start of work related to the NCS and limitations on the
available information. The ERT completed its field work in March-April
2000, circulated a draft report in July-September 2000. There were a substantial
number of comments received and the final report was completed in November
2000. The lapse in timing for the production of the final report was the
result of scheduling problems on the part of the ERT leader.
2.3
Serious limitations on quantitative information exist, and it was not
possible to draw conclusions based on statistically-based approaches,
for example, on the impact of the NCS on improvements in river water quality.
Furthermore, because the NCS is only one of several influences on environmental
and other outcomes, it is difficult to definitively point to its role
in some successes. This point is raised as a criticism of the entire process
by some individuals from Pakistani institutions in comments they provided
concerning the draft report. It is important to recognize that this issue
is a problem in most umbrella-style guidance initiatives wherever they
are done, especially when there is not good baseline data available at
the start, or a control case (i.e. what would the condition of Pakistan’s
environment be now if there had been no NCS).
2.4
The ERT is confident that it has been able to address key issues in a
reasonable fashion, and that the conclusions and recommendations are solid.
The range of interviews, focus groups, document reviews, etc., provide
a surprisingly strong convergence around certain key points. This is not
to say that we expect unanimous support for all aspects of our findings
and suggestions. Indeed, there are a variety of strong opinions about
the future development of the NCS. Ultimately it will be up to the many
actors involved in NCS to determine how the observations of the report
can best be implemented nationally and at more local levels. Thus we have
not tried to be totally prescriptive at any point in the report—there
is more than one pathway to sustainability. Furthermore, while we illustrate
progress and problems with many examples, there are many more that have
not been discussed. It would be impossible, even in a report of twice
the length of this document to do full justice to the interviews, background
reports and range of experience of a decade of planning and implementation
of the NCS. We hope that by bringing together ideas based on rich and
thoughtful inputs of many people and organisations; solid ground has been
prepared for future plans.
2.5
The organization of this report is in seven chapters plus nine annexes.
In addition we have provided an Executive Summary and Prospectus that
can be used as a stand-alone document that considers implications of the
recommendations. Chapter 1 makes the case for a sustainable development
approach for the future—and highlights why this should not be postponed
for financial or other reasons. The current Chapter outlines the evolution
of the NCS, and considers why it was such an advanced approach in relation
to other initiatives domestically and internationally. Chapter 2 also
outlines the analytical approach of the review and various constraints.
Chapter 3 assesses the impacts of the NCS between 1992-2000 in relation
to key issues such as creating the space for conservation and environment,
awareness-raising, institutional development and potential outcomes. In
Chapter 4 the financing and management of the NCS is reviewed, including
a focus on new financing approaches, and on strengthening leadership both
within and outside of government. Chapter 5 reviews the dynamic context
of both national and international factors likely to affect further implementation
of the NCS. Chapter 6 considers important needs for moving forward with
a renewed approach for the NCS. The report concludes with five key lessons
learned and six major recommendations, all outlined in Chapter 7.
NCS
Context 1980-2000
2.6
The Pakistan NCS is one of the best-known national conservation strategies,
externally admired for its vision and potential at the time it was adopted.
It was developed in response to the World Conservation Strategy (WCS)
launched by IUCN in 1980. The WCS was one of the first global initiatives
to highlight sustainable development.fn 13
The NCS emerged after almost a decade of discussion and analysis, and
was adopted at the highest levels within the government of Pakistan.fn
14 It was highly attractive to donors, especially in the period
after the Earth Summit, when sustainable development awareness percolated
into the programs of development agencies. Key events during the formulation
and implementation periods are noted in Box 1.
Early
Implementation Perspectives
2.7 David Runnallsfn
15 in a 1995 review (Box 2) concluded that the NCS
Goes
much further than that of any of the much acclaimed Green Plans of the
OECD countries. It goes further than the National Conservation Strategies
of other developing countries. Pakistan has set itself a formidable challenge
It
is not surprising that its implementation is difficult, uneven, and time
consuming. For it requires not only changes in the institutions of government
and in the way policy is formulated; it also requires fundamental changes
in the way people think about their relationships to the natural environment
and to such fundamental issues as social equity and the elimination of
poverty.
2.8
The implementation plan within the original NCS document, and a follow-up
1993 document focuses on budgets for individual programs, in order to
garner donor support and to demonstrate practical results. As Runnalls
noted: In a perverse way this may also turn out to be one of the
document’s weaknesses. For it shifts the focus to the familiar terrain
of project preparation and approval
and away from the fundamental
shifts in the structure of public institutions and macroeconomic policy
implied by the main arguments of the document.
Box
1. NCS Development and Implementation 1980-2000.
Pertinent milestones
for the Pakistan NCS included:
- A nine
year gestation (1983-92): leading to a strategy unprecedented
in the country’s history for its comprehensive nature and focus
on conservation as a critical component of development. Initial
request to IUCN from government came in 1983. NCS adopted in 1992.
- A focus
on government leadership and consultation: the NCS document
was prepared with the assistance of a secretariat established
in 1988 over a 3 year period under supervision of the Deputy Chairman
of the Planning Commission, one of Pakistan’ most powerful bureaucrats.
It involved more than 3000 people through workshops and other
consultations.
- Three
operating principles were established: achieving greater public
partnership in development and management; merging environment
and economics in decision making; focusing on durable improvements
in the quality of life of Pakistanis.
- Government
spending on natural resource management and efficiency
of resource use was to increase: from 4% of national investment
to 8% by 2000.
- Seven
level strategy for implementation: federal and provincial
leadership; departmental responsibility; district coordination;
community participation; individual action; corporate tasks; government
and NGO support.
- 1993-98
Plan of Action: was presented via a Cabinet-level Implementation
Committee to Pakistan donor consortium in 1993. 14 core areas
(see Annexes 1 and 5 of this report) plus four cross-cutting areas
for immediate action: institutional strengthening (technical,
regulatory and participatory); supportive framework of regulations
and economic incentives; broad-based communications for public
awareness; project implementation in priority areas.
- NCS attracted
external funding from the start: IBRD began environment project
identification in 1985, leading to EPRCP which ran from 1992 to
1999 in support of capacity development within government. The
World Bank agreed to accept NCS in place of a NEAP. PEP partnership
established with funded by CIDA in 1995 (CIDA and UNDP largely
funded the NCS preparation process.) Other donors responded by
increasing emphasis on environmental portfolio.
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Box
2. Early Lessons Learned about NCS Development and Implementation.
(Runnalls, 1995. The Story of Pakistan’s NCS)
Why
did the Strategy work initially? Indigenous process
that penetrated fairly deeply into government, driven by consensus
at senior levels, so there was acceptance by all concerned ministries,
with signoff; provinces had opportunity for comment; in addition
NGOs, mass media, public and private sector all had involvement.
A spirit of partnership was fostered; the search process involving
expertise from Pakistan and abroad identified key issues and
catalyzed interest and alerted government of serious nature of problems
and later participation of Pakistan in Rio Earth Summit as Chair
of G77. Key inputs from several outside advisors in early
years. Donor agencies backed a process rather than a project.
Insistence on quality, especially on the part of some support
organizations such as IUCN.
Preliminary
lessons learned (to 1994-95). NCS is a political document
that should facilitate the Strategy’s acceptance by the economic
community and to protect government implementers from the rest of
the bureacracy. NCS should be a SD strategy (it already enjoyed
the support of some Pakistani finance ministers). SD requires
major institutional change for its implementation, not only
within government—create and develop new institutions, revise and
strengthen existing ones, and create linkages among federal departments
and between federal government and provincial and local governments.
Process is at least as important as the final product. Implementation
plan largely about capacity building. Outside organizations
must be sensitive to the indigenous nature of the process.
Outside consultants should be chosen well and used sparingly.
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Linkages:
Environmental Sustainability, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction
2.9
Clearly for the NCS to be effective as a sustainable development strategy,
it had to deal effectively with the linkage of poverty reduction, wealth
generation that can actually benefit the poor, and environmental sustainability.
How can environment contribute to ‘pro poor growth’ and ‘pro poor human
development’? In two ways:
- By avoiding
or mitigating the health and productivity impacts of pollution caused
by an array of factors, chief among them: (1) air emissions, particularly
in the large cities, from traffic, industrial sources, and homes, with
a high incidence of respiratory problems; (2) water contamination causing
high morbidity and mortality from water-born diseases (e.g., diarrhoea,
hepatitis, and typhoid); (3) inadequate management of hazardous chemicals
used in both industry and agriculture; (4) inadequate solid waste management;
(5) inadequate hygiene practices and food quality standards; (6) substandard
housing conditions; and (vii) inadequate safety, hygiene, and labour
practices in the work place.
- By reducing
the occurrence and impacts of natural resource degradation, and by
improving conservation for economic development and livelihoods opportunities
of the poor. The intensification of agricultural production (particularly
in the Indus Basin), through irrigation, increases in both yield and
area under cultivation, has led to increases in production and food
supply. However, this has been accompanied by increased salinity and
soil degradation, riverine deforestation and mangrove destruction, as
well as decline in biodiversity, fish resources, and water quality impairment
from agro-chemicals. Future economic development opportunities will
be constrained if the degradation of the natural resource base continues
unchecked. Meanwhile population and consumption continues to grow rapidly
and poverty is not being reduced. This growth further exacerbates land
degradation, deforestation, marine and coastal degradation, as well
as urban and industrial pollution. It is this double-pronged set of
problems that create a vicious circle of lost opportunity and degradation
that can and should be addressed.
2.10
A second key question is how can environmental sustainability contribute
to economic growth?
- By including
environmental considerations in macro-economic and sectoral policies
and the associated incentive structures, gradually it should be
possible to move away from a situation where every signal is to ‘cut
and run’ today, because it may not be accessible tomorrow. To avoid
this race to the bottom in terms of sustainability means ‘levelling
playing fields’ in a fashion that reduces corrupt forest practices,
unfair water allocation, and makes cleaner energy sources more available,
while making it more difficult to access low quality fuels. Policies
that foster the adoption within Pakistan of internationally accepted
environment and resource management practice—a ‘race to the top’—also
helps economic development by attracting progressive businesses that
can transfer environmentally-sound technologies and by providing a greater
access to environmentally-conscious markets in the USA and Europe in
particular.
- By ensuring
consistency and continuity in the environment-economy policy relationship,
the tendency can be avoided of people taking advantage of situations
that they believe will not be enforceable, or will change over the longer-term.
- By providing
safeguards for clean growth the population of Pakistan will become
healthier, more productive and therefore better contributors. The existing
air and water pollution problems are contributing significantly to poor
health, with the greatest ill effects likely being experienced by the
poor. As well, through better management of ecosystems and through improved
urban planning, the risk attached to natural resource hazards such as
floods, drought, and windstorms can be significantly reduced, with lower
losses to productivity and less need for emergency measures.
2.11
We stress these types of linkages from the beginning, and return to them
throughout the report. For they are the foundation on which the future
of the NCS and of sustainable development in Pakistan depends.
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NCS
Focus during Implementation
2.12 Examination
of the NCS through a lens focusing on the triple needs of the environment,
the poor and of economic development clearly shows that the NCS:
-
was largely
focused on achieving environmental outcomes (centred around ecosystem
integrity);
-
policy focus
was geared towards environmental institutions and very weak on macro-economic
and sectoral policies;
-
‘incentives’
focus was mainly on regulation and ‘command and control’ type approaches,
and very weak on economic instruments;
-
lacked prioritisation,
as evidenced by the absence of any form of evaluation of costs and
benefits and fiscal implications, except in the most general terms;
and
-
clearly did
not address poverty reduction—the most fundamental of the core development
issues—as directly as it might have.
Thus
the NCS became a largely environmental guidebook (similar to the more
conventional National Environmental Action Plans) with a large “shopping
list” of needs at all levels rather than serving as an implementable
strategy for institutional transformation towards sustainability.
In Table 2 we summarize where NCS appears to have placed greater or
lesser emphasis in addressing environment-economy and environment-poverty
concerns.
Table 2.
NCS Relative Emphasis on Environmental, Social and Economic Areas.
Key
linkages between environmental sustainability and economic growth
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Key
linkages between environmental sustainability and poverty reduction
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NCS
focused more on:
Safeguards
for internalizing the cost of environmental degradation:
NEQS
EIAs
Monitoring
and enforcement
Strengthening
of environmental institutions
Mass
awareness
NCS
focused less on:
Macro-economic
and sectoral economic policies:
Economic Pricing (water, energy)
Pollution taxes *
Removal
of env. damaging subsidies (agriculture, oil and gas)
User
charges and cost recovery
Energy
sector reforms
Agric.
and forest sector reforms (taxation, land distribution and renegotiated
rights and responsibilities, irrigation policy)
*
initiative awaiting implementation
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NCS
focused more on:
Safeguarding
the country’s natural resource base, with the implicit assumption
that this would lead to a better quality of life for all Pakistanis
in the long-run.
NCS
focused less (and not directly) on:
Health
outcomes (through clean water and air, hygiene, housing, and education)
Livelihood
outcomes (through sustainable management of natural resources)
Prevention/mitigation
of environmental risks and economic shocks
Empowerment
and social capital development
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How
the NCS was to be Implemented
2.13
The initial Cabinet Committee for NCS Implementation was established
in March 1992. It included the Minister for Environment as convenor,
the Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs, the Minister for Education,
the Minister for Science and Technology, the Minister for Food and Agriculture,
the Minister of State for Cooperatives and Forestry, the Deputy Chairman,
Planning Commission, Secretary General, Finance and Revenue Divisions,
Secretary, Finance Division, Secretary, Environment and Urban Affairs
Division, and the Additional Secretary, Inter-Provincial Coordination.
Unfortunately this cabinet committee only ever met twice. It can be
revitalized and updated in terms of membership, since the concept was
good. A NCS Coordination Unit was established to provide the secretariat
support for implementation.
2.14
The main approach to NCS implementation was to be via four partnerships:
government and NGO (for NGO capacity building), government and
private sector (regulations and incentives), within the government
(among agencies and federal-provincial for institution building),
and a mass awareness campaign to link government and the public
at large. An important move was the development of the Pakistan Environmental
Programme (PEP), launched in July 1994, aiming to build capacity of
four institutions—the NCS Unit of MELGRD, the Environment Section at
the Planning and Development Division within the Planning Commission,
the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and the World Conservation
Union IUCN-Pakistan Program. PEP, funded by CIDA, and rather thoroughly
reviewed at various times[fn
16] has endured and is currently the essential, albeit imperfect
mechanism, for NCS coordination. A second major project was the Environment
Protection and Resource Conservation (EPRC) Project funded by the World
Bank and implemented through MELGRD. The EPRC not only focused on institutional
development but also undertook some pilot natural resource management
projects.
2.15
In a 1993 plan of action prepared for a donor coordination meeting laying
out the five-year plan priorities[fn 17], it was suggested that a financial outlay
of Rs. 19.234 billion, exclusive of on-going water management, forest
management, sewage and several other environmental programs, would be
required. As much as 82 % of the overall allocation was to be spent
on provincial governments and special areas, 16 % on federal agencies
and 2.6 % on an NGO support fund. The allocation by subject area was
to be 38% for pollution prevention and control including urban waste
management, 10% forestry and plantations, 10% watershed protection,
biodiversity conservation 9%, with 33% shared among the other nine core
areas. This plan became the main implementing document for the NCS,
not updated since.
Constraints
on Environmental Action during NCS Implementation
2.16
The extent of environment and sustainability neglect, and continued
poor performance of environmental institutions can be attributed to
four major constraints:
-
Lack
of political commitment and weak governance. Despite the NCS framework
for sustainable natural resource management and environmental protection
(which was prepared in a uniquely consultative way prior to being
adopted by the Cabinet), and input through a number of donor-funded
initiatives, environmental considerations are still not fully integrated
into the country’s economic growth and poverty reduction plans.
-
Weak institutional
capacity. Despite important progress in establishing a regulatory
capacity and environmental institutions both at the federal and
provincial level (updated environmental legislation provides for
delegation of monitoring and enforcement powers at the provincial
level), this institutional apparatus will remain largely ineffective,
as long as the country does not have:
i
the necessary human resource capacity and incentives
for implementation;
ii
a credible monitoring and enforcement system;
iii
a sustainable funding mechanism (based on “cost recovery”
and the “polluter-pays-principle”); and
iv
a process of engaging the public through information disclosure,
education and mass awareness programs, and participatory mechanisms.
-
Weak
policy framework. This is reflected in:
i
inadequate valuation of resources (e.g., water, energy);
ii
little or no influence on sectoral policies (e.g., energy, urban,
transport, agriculture, irrigation, forestry, health, and education),
and import/export policies;
iii
weak understanding of linkages between environment and
poverty outcomes; and
iv
limited forums and processes for debate, learning action
on sustainable development.
-
Weak
fiscal management and resource mobilization. Despite a provision
in the 1997 Environmental Act for instituting a “pollution charge”
for industrial effluent, and provincial “sustainable development funds”,
no broad based policies are in place for promoting cost recovery,
re-use and re-cycling, user charges (e.g. from nature tourism and
National Parks), and environmental fees and taxes. Consequently, environmental
agencies are necessarily dependent on very slim budgetary transfers
and continuously seek donor funding (e.g. from CIDA, SDC, GTZ, ADB,
EU, UNDP, and World Bank).
2.17
These observations need to be tempered somewhat by the recognition that
over this past decade, for the first time environmental issues have
been extensively debated alongside other development and economic concerns.
2.18
All of the constraints relate to the overall issue of a crisis in governance
within Pakistanthat unfolded and worsened over the decade. It was certainly
not an easy time to be introducing ideas as bold and inclusive as those
of the NCS. Underlying the problems of governance are basic constraints
such as a society still partly under feudal arrangements with weak government-civil
society relations and subject to corruption.
General
Analytical Framework for the NCS Review
2.19
The NCS conceptualization emerged in the late 1980’s in a context
within Pakistan of massive poverty, severe environmental degradation,
lack of awareness, and extremely limited institutional capacity to deal
with environmental issues. The NCS’s highly participatory and inclusive
approach was in many ways futuristic. However, with three major and
overlapping objectives[fn 18], 14 core areas with a number of cross-cutting issues, and
no less than 60 clusters of outcomes (most of which had specific quantitative
targets associated with them) within 68 programs, NCS was inherently
complex. But it appeared to lack four fundamental ingredients: (1)
a clear enough implementation road map, (2) a monitoring system geared
towards evaluating tangible changes in the behavior of institutions
and environmental quality on the ground, (3) a system of accountability
for outcomes, and (4) a multi-stakeholder process for keeping
an overview of the NCS, learning and enriching it. These four points
occupied the MTR to a considerable extent.
2.20
NCS’s implementation was stifled by its weight and ambitiousness.
In addition, there were weaknesses in appraising and providing mitigating
measures for risks associated with achievement of objectives (e.g.,
macro-economic factors and constraints to resource mobilization, political
will on the part of decision-makers) and implementation capacity. These
were reflected in the lack of an evaluation and monitoring system and
the lack of capacity and flexibility to learn and adapt—adjusting course
and targets as appropriate. The points raised in these two paragraphs
are reviewed in more detail later in this report. They are introduced
here because they had an important impact on the capacity of the ERT
to fully address the MTR TOR, as noted below.
Evaluation
Criteria
2.21
The MTR itself was complex, and was based on equally ambitious terms
of reference (reflective of NCS complexity). It became clear to the
ERT that a detailed analysis, and evaluation of the specific objectives
of the 14 core areas in quantitative terms was neither feasible, nor
appropriate in light of the information base. Thus the ETR decided
to adopt three evaluation criteria:
-
A simple
sustainable development framework against which to assess achievement
of the stated objectives of the NCS. This framework (Box 3)
allows development objectives to be characterized in terms of three
types of outcomes and the linkages between them: (1) economic growth;
(2) poverty reduction and social development; and (3) environmental
sustainability. Many of the traditional development efforts have
focused on achieving poverty reduction and social well-being through
economic growth. Less attention has been paid to the linkages between
environmental sustainability and economic growth on the one hand,
and environmental sustainability and poverty reduction, on the other.
Therefore much less is known about the nature of these linkages.
This ‘critical triangle’ of development outcomes is by no means
a panacea. But it represents a simple way to start identifying the
essential institutional and policy linkages that need to
be at the core of the country’s sustainable development agenda.
-
A qualitative
rather than quantitative assessment of the 60 outcome groups of
NCS. In this case, because of the paucity of reliable quantitative
information, we have used anecdotal evidence, results of focus group
meetings, impressions from site visits, expert opinion and the collective
experience of the MTR partners, to piece together an evaluation
of outcomes.
-
A review
of the processes/systems intended to communicate and implement the
NCS. This review is based largely on institutional analysis
derived from interviews inside and outside of government, with limited
comparisons based on experience internationally.
Box 3. SD Linkages
in Pakistan.
MTR
Analysis Approach
2.22
The analysis draws primarily from documented case studies of on-the-ground
experiences of different approaches and projects over the past 10 years,
and from extensive focus group consultations, and individual interviews
about progress and problems. In addition, a number of implementation
sites throughout the country were carefully selected through desk studies
and interviews in order to identify a representative range of the different
delivery approaches (i.e. ‘institutional models’ or ‘institutional arrangements’)
that had been piloted across the different regions and sectors. The
overall MTR approach (detailed in Annex 1) consisted of:
-
Preparation
of background studies and assessments. Nine studies were commissioned,
covering a range of stakeholder consultations and crosscutting issues.
These were carried out from October 1999-April 2000. In addition,
PEP partners and the World Bank contributed evaluations of their
programs. The studies are listed in Annex 4.
-
Desk study.
During the desk study, information was collected from studies, reports,
books and articles related to the sectors covered under NCS. In
addition to this initial review, discussions were held with relevant
central-level stakeholders, local line agencies, and NGOs to seek
additional information.
-
Consultations
and focus group discussions.In addition to the MTR public consultations
held in various parts of the country in late 1999, discussions were
held by the ERT with relevant stakeholders, national and local agencies
of government, and other key informants. The final list of institutions
and people consulted and cases is presented in Annex 5. The institutional
arrangements observed are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.
-
Field visits.
Field visits in March-April 2000 by members of the ERT consisted
of visits to provinces and territories to investigate the state
of provincial conservation strategies and to visit selected projects,
with interviews to collect detailed information and evaluations.
However, it is important to note that, except for a few cases, field
visits were targeted to key informants, and not beneficiaries directly.
The field visits are noted in Annex 6.
-
Validation
workshop. A national multi-sectoral meeting, attended by more
than 80 participants, was convened in mid-April 2000 by the Minister
of MELGRD to share initial findings and recommendations of the MTR
and obtain stakeholder feedback.
·
Feedback from Draft Report. More than two dozen individuals and
organizations provided comments and observations on the draft report
circulated from July to September. Many of the comments sketched out
elements for future directions in addition to corrections and observations
about the conclusions and recommendations.
2.23
The information gathered through the background reports, desk studies
and field visits was synthesized to identify the roles, responsibilities
and relationships of key actors in NCS implementation, and to consider
the extent to which outcomes had been achieved. It is important to note
that no systematic review or analysis of the individual 14 core areas
and associated 68 programs was conducted since that task proved beyond
the capacity of information and time available to the ERT.
2.24
The ambitious terms of refily:Arial;font-weight:normal'>matrix with
seven key outcome areas and eleven core processes/systems (Annex 3).
This was to guide the overall effort, especially with respect to performance
evaluation. While the matrix was useful for general organization of
the MTR’s efforts and findings, it was never intended for quantitative
measurement of performance. Furthermore, there are some important missing
elements. The ERT has used the matrix as general guidance, so that comments
concerning the core processes/systems are found in the text of the MTR
report. But the performance of the NCS is considered largely in qualitative
rather than quantitative terms, derived from inputs from the stakeholders
and the material pieced together from a wide variety of sources, including
information provided by the NCS Unit in the course of the MTR.
Constraints
and Limitations in Conducting the Review
2.30
The most significant limitations centre around two matters. The first
is simply the lack of reliable environmental and other information.
This is commented upon in various parts of the report. It is a problem
made worse by the long period spanned by the review, which makes it
difficult to assemble reliable information. The second matter is the
lack of much direct consultation with beneficiaries throughout the MTR.
The opinion sampling of people likely to be affected by NCS implementation
is not well developed across the wide range of program areas.
It has been pointed
out to the ERT that rarely are comprehensive strategies in Pakistan
subject to such thorough review as this one. Thus the inherent challenges
are in a sense even more regrettable since it is impossible to be as
quantitative or as definitive in many of the observations as would be
desired. It is encouraging that the GoP, other PEP partners, and NCS
implementation are so commitment to the review and to the use of the
resulting product.
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Notes:
12. MELGRD. Pakistan National Conservation Strategy, the Mid Term Review:
A Process Overview. March 2000.
13. The WCS was produced in revised form in 1991. Caring for the Earth:
A Strategy for Sustainable Living. IUCN/UNEP/WWF, Gland.
14. IUCN and the Government of Pakistan. 1992. National Conservation
Strategy. 451 pages.
15. Runnalls, D. 1995. The Story of Pakistan’s NCS. IUCN-Pakistan.
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