Welcome to NSSD.net

Strategies for sustainable development need to build on and provide a framework for other forms of strategy processes operating at national level. Once the concept of the strategy as an adaptive and cyclical process has been embraced, then, whether a biodiversity action plan, national Agenda 21, World Bank NEAP, or other multi-sectoral process, it is likely to have similar management needs.

The strategy process should include information assembly and analysis, policy formulation, action planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Each of these components is driven and facilitated by participation and communication. A multi-track process, in which most of the strategy components occur simultaneously, is likely to be more effective than a single-track process in which most occur sequentially. The strategy experience to date has usually followed a sequential
approach without fully appreciating the central functions of communication and participation. Inevitably, a multi-track process including working links between the various components and continual reflection and revision will be a more complex management process demanding a broader range of skills than the more conventional approach.

The basic management structure or engine for most strategies has been a steering committee and secretariat and, although they have come in many shapes and sizes, experience suggests some general rules for their functions, location, status and composition. The start-up phase of a strategy can be a time of some frustration while relationships with existing activities are thought through, key participants (including donors) brought on board, decisions are made and the basic directions set
from a range of options. Well-targeted, decisive but diplomatic management at this early stage can determine the level of success of the strategy in later phases.

Once the political decision has been made to begin a strategy, the main participants need to have a shared understanding of the way forward. These participants include, at the least, the small group of government agencies, and possibly NGOs, which will be taking the primary responsibility for managing the process. Awareness may have built up during preliminary discussions of a possible strategy, but in some cases, these will have involved only a few influential administrators and politicians. It can be useful at this stage for a lead government agency to conduct a round of briefing meetings within and outside government on the nature of strategies and the steps the government now intends to take to get the process going.

Prior to the establishment of some formal structure for managing the strategy process, some uncertainty is to be expected, the extent of which will depend largely on the original source of the strategy initiative. This source can determine the initial management approach; although, as the managers of the strategy gain confidence and the process gains momentum, its origin fades in importance. Strategies that have departed from the original model to truly express national identity have tended to be the most successful.

The elements, structures and resources required for the management process will be generic to all strategies, be they:

In some developing countries, the decision to proceed with a strategy has not met with external funding support and the initiative has gone no further. The decision to go ahead may have been made by a single ministry (often an environmental ministry), but without the critical mass of commitment within government that would ensure the redistribution of internal resources to support the process at the outset.

Early NCSs were often confronted with these initial resource constraints. Kenya, for example, was one of the first countries to express an interest in undertaking an NCS, but IUCN, as the external technical support organization, could not muster the resources. During the early 1980s, IUCN had some 15 countries on record as having made formal requests for assistance to initiate conservation strategies. Resources for these ere never found. In other countries like Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, where the decision to proceed with an NCS was accompanied by internal commitments of technical expertise and funds, this hiatus did not occur.

Even where resources have been available, difficult decisions on how best to proceed can still delay start-up. Guidance from an external technical agency, which can draw from extensive strategy experience, can be essential in the start-up phase. Once a decision to undertake a strategy has been made, the first step for a government is forging partnerships between donors and an appropriate technical support agency. This negotiation process can take some time; extending well over a year for the Bangladesh, Vietnam and Tanzania NCSs.

Case studies of strategies in Asia, Africa and Latin America (IUCN, 1994 A,B,C) show that the problem of attracting necessary resources in a timely way to build on gov-ernment commitment has plagued NCSs at all phases of their development. World Bank NEAPs in Africa, on the other hand, have been remarkable for the efficiency with which they get up and running. There are a number of very good reasons for this, which provide lessons for the future:

Although efficacious in getting NEAP management under way, the World Bank approach can have its costs, as discussed in Chapter 10. The key to good strategy management is ensuring that the process proceeds at a pace and in a form which best suits local conditions and which is most sensitive to existing capacities.

The relationship of the initiative with other strategies, either underway or under consideration, is another factor that causes uncertainty during the period of the initial decision. A country may have embarked on a Tropical Forest Action Plan; have obligations to prepare a Biodiversity Action Plan covering much of the same issues; be partway through an NCS; be required as a World Bank borrower to prepare an NEAP; and, having participated in UNCED, be now debating how to respond to the Agenda 21 call for a national strategy for sustainable development. This is a common situation and has been perplexing for key policymakers. There has now been sufficient experience of strategies to resolve these relationships and to provide a clear and decisive management framework which can accommodate them.

The separation and sequence of these elements is somewhat arbitrary. As the strategy progresses, assessment (information assembly and analysis) and policy formulation are likely to be a part of implementation that best starts from the earliest stages. Participation and communication are driving forces of all elements of the process.

With many strategies, information assembly and analysis, policy formulation, action planning, and document preparation have followed one another, and have been concentrated largely in a preparation phase. Capacity-building, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation have been concentrated in an implementation phase.

In this approach to a strategy process, many of the elements are sequential, as if following each other along a single track. Figure 3 gives an example.

There are several drawbacks to this single-track approach. First, it encourages an excessive emphasis on the preparation of a strategy document, and an investment in information assembly, policy formulation and planning quite out of proportion to what can be implemented. This is likely to reinforce any existing prejudice that strategies are academic and irrelevant to the real business of government and society. The multiple steps under policy formulation and action planning are usual during the initial development (preparation) of the strategy policies and action plan, but may not be necessary in subsequent cycles.

Second, it fosters a view of strategies as linear rather than cyclical. In the single-track model, there is no commitment to regular review and revision of the policy framework for the strategy as an essential component of a country’s development cycle. It is viewed more as a one-off event.

Third, it denies the strategy one of its strongest assets: its ability to focus on the elements of the process that will have the greatest strategic effect at a particular point in time. For example, communication of certain messages may be most important at one point, and capacity-building most important at another.

Finally, the single-track approach does not reflect what is needed. Participation, information assembly and analysis, communication, and monitoring are continuous process elements needed throughout the life of the strategy. Evaluation, policy formulation and action planning will need to occur regularly in each process cycle. Implementation can take place at the same time as policy formulation and action planning.

In many cases one of the first needs is to build the capacity to undertake a strategy; until this is done, the rest of the strategy process is either halted or has to be developed by outsiders. Recognizing this, a num-ber of strategies – in Bhutan and Guinea-Bissau, for example – have begun with capacity-building: the formation of a team, the training of that team on a project (such as organization of a core group to develop environmental assessment procedures) or a thematic or regional strategy.

Early implementation of those aspects of the strategy for which commitment has been obtained also helps to prevent a common problem with many strategies so far: a hiatus between the main preparation phase of a strategy and the main implementation. The more the division between preparation and implementation phase can be overcome, the more confident participants will be that the strategy justifies their commitment of time, energy and money. Demonstration projects can be particularly helpful to this end.

Consequently, a multi-track approach is likely to offer the most practical form of strategy process. In this approach, many (but not necessarily all) of the elements are undertaken simultaneously. Figure 4 illustrates the strategy cycle.

Using the term ‘multi-track’ is still a little misleading. It implies that the tracks do not meet and ignores the need for feedback. In practice, there will be feedback among the different elements of the strategy process, each influencing the others.

In addition, there will be feedback between one phase or cycle of the strategy and another. This feedback will occur through effective monitoring and evaluation. Feedback will need to reflect how the strategy influences and is influenced by events, such as changes in attitudes and behaviour, markets and prices, population growth, and environmental conditions.

Thus, a ‘picture’ of a strategy would not be a long line, or even a set of long lines, stretching into the future. It would more likely be a spiral of lines indicating activities and feedback loops that progressively approach the goal.

There are, of course, many possible versions of this approach. There is no single correct way of managing a strategy. The need is to be pragmatic and incremental; aiming not for perfection but for constant improvement. The cyclical nature of a strategy, whereby each element of the process may be repeated several times, means that the strategy can start off quite modestly,
gradually becoming more ambitious.

For example, participation in the strategy needs eventually to be both wide and deep,involving many people in all sectors of society. If a strategy were to start off by attempting to involve everybody, however, it would quickly become bogged down and exhaust its resources. Participation in the first cycle of the strategy may involve only a few key sectors of society but can be widened and deepened as the strategy develops.

Inevitably, strategies are processes which require optimization, opportunism, and often muddling through in complicated administrative and political environments. Because of their complexity, strategies must cater to and involve many interests, and offer mechanisms for defining and agreeing on trade-offs. Like all processes that determine how resources should be used and by whom, strategies are constantly subject to political forces. These are necessary and useful influences, so long as the strategy secretariat adheres to an open process and is flexible; seeking to capitalize on opportunities as they arise to promote agreed strategy objectives.

The strategy should be designed to influence the development process and decision-making as quickly and thoroughly as possible. Political support, continuity and momentum require that the strategy get results, notably visible policy and legislative changes and demonstrable success of some concepts on the ground.

The large number of process elements, their specific technical requirements, and the number of participants in a strategy call for good process management. Regardless of where the strategy is in its cycle, two bodies are usually required for this: a steering committee and a strategy secretariat.

The main tasks of these bodies are to coordinate, facilitate and support the work of the participants; ie, the organizations within and outside government who prepare and implement the strategy. The steering committee and secretariat also may have to undertake some of the strategy tasks themselves to get it going, to demonstrate and test policies, or to execute a major change in scope or direction. But the strategy will be pointless if it is regarded as belonging to the steering committee and secretariat rather than as being a central concern and activity of the rest of government and society.

As facilitating and coordinating bodies, neither the steering committee nor the secretariat should have vested interests in a sector, or be located within a sector or interest group. This usually means that they have to be specially constituted, unless an NCS, NEAP or other type of strategy with an existing steering committee and secretariat is already in progress.

They should be located where they can have the greatest influence on the national development system. This may be in the office of the President or Prime Minister, a Ministry of Economic Planning, or an independent office directly linked to the cabinet or a powerful cabinet body. Locating the steering committee and secretariat in a line ministry is less desirable. It could identify them too much with the ministry concerned, and result in the strategy being resisted or ignored due to inter-agency rivalries.

If the strategy is a partnership of government, business and other non-governmental bodies, the location may be outside government. If so, there should still be a strong and direct link to the cabinet or its equivalent to maintain the commitment to, and influence of, the strategy.

The steering committee and secretariat may be set up for an indefinite or a specified time period. Since strategy development is unpredictable, it is important to allow for flexibility and for changes in the composition of the steering committee and secretariat as the strategy progresses. It is also important to ensure their continuity between phases or cycles of the strategy.

The function of the steering committee is to provide overall direction for the strategy, taking its mandate from the country’s highest possible authority. It will also:

The mandating authority is the body that authorizes the steering committee to develop the strategy. It may be the chief executive of government, the cabinet, or the legislature. NEAPs usually call for a cabinet committee, specifically-formed for the purpose, to be chaired by the head of government. This disbands upon completion of the plan, which, in Africa, has usually taken about 18 months. The cabinet committee is asked to:

During the initial development of the strategy, and probably during its early implementation, it will be necessary for the steering committee to have clear authority for making decisions based on the outputs of the strategy (up to an agreed limit). But as the strategy engages more participants, and as it progresses from cycle to cycle, the character and function of the steering ommittee can be expected to change: it is likely to become less a coordinating and facilitating body and more a monitoring body.

Given this role, the steering committee should consist of high-level representatives of the main participants in the strategy. As the scope and nature of the strategy changes – and particularly if the participants change – the composition of the steering committee will probably have to change as well. In some countries, committee status may be considered inadequate. It could, therefore, have the status of a parastatal or permanent commission, reporting directly to cabinet. The Australian Resource Assessment Commission was a statutory authority established in 1989 to pursue the objectives of the National Ecologically Sustainable Development Strategy. Although abolished four years later, it provides a useful model for permanently institutionalizing a participatory strategy process at national level and is discussed further in Chapter 8.

The steering committee is likely to function best if it is chaired by an individual or institution acceptable to both the mandating authority and the main participants. The chairperson will be more effective if he or she is clearly impartial and independent of sectoral interests, and has strong vision and commitment to the strategy process.

The strategy secretariat’s function is to service the needs of the steering committee, and undertake the day-to-day organization and management of the strategy process. It will usually be responsible for the following:

The secretariat will need to be headed by someone with a good understanding of the strategy process, and of high standing in environment and/or development policy. He or she should command the respect of government, business and NGOs and have access to the highest levels while remaining open to all other levels. Depending upon the scope of the strategy, other professional staff would ordinarily cover economics; environmental and natural resource management; environmental impact assessment; social sciences; development and business; legislation and institutions; participation; communications, information and education. Administrative staff will also be required, including someone proficient in organizing seminars and workshops.

Continuity of secretariat staff is particularly important. Some secretariats have relied heavily on regular input by consultants to undertake various studies or activities. Although consultants have a crucial role, particularly in the flexibility they bring to the strategy process, there are substantial benefits in the secretariat having solid technical expertise within its own staff.

These benefits are enhanced if some secretariat staff are on secondment from key government agencies or NGOs. Long-term staffing arrangements:

The secretariat need not be large if the expertise is permanently accessible within government, as is the case in Ethiopia. There, the secretariat comprises only three professionals but has continuing access to a wide network of government experts committed to the process through a system of committees (see Box 14). The main point is to not rely too heavily on the use of short-term consultants. Otherwise, written reports can dominate to the detriment of other elements of the process.

Participation and communications are driving forces interwoven with all aspects of strategy management. Their importance in national strategies has rarely been reflected in secretariat staff expertise. Team members need to have skills and experience in participation methods, social survey, conflict resolution and group dynamics. Most countries have a richer experience in these fields through local strategies, which the strategy secretariat should seek to draw upon.

Box 14: Staff resources in national strategy secretariats

The size of a strategy secretariat will depend on the maturity of the process (ie whether it has gone beyond its first cycle), its coverage and the extent to which the secretariat has been given responsibility for managing capacity-building and demonstration projects. The following examples illustrate the approach taken by a number of countries in Asia and Africa to staffing their strategy secretariats.

Bangladesh NCS: An expatriate adviser had the overall responsibility for the day-to-day running of the NCS secretariat, reporting to the executive vice-chairperson of the Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council, where the project was housed. Initial moves to establish the secretariat began in 1989, but it took more than a year to reach its full complement, which comprised the expatriate adviser, a national consultant, two junior technical officers and three support staff. The secretariat commissioned 20 background papers by selected national consultants and reviewers. The secretariat was disbanded in 1993 following completion of the NCS document.

Ethiopia NCS: From 1990 to 1994, the Ethiopian NCS secretariat was located in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. The secretariat was staffed by an Ethiopian NCS Director, with support from an Ethiopian professional, an expatriate adviser provided by IUCN, and two support staff. The secretariat worked through 29 regional task forces and 12 task forces at national level covering sectoral and inter-sectoral issues. For the implementation phase, beginning in late 1994, the secretariat is expected to be included in the structure of the new Ministry for Environment.

Guinea NEAP: An inter-ministerial unit was created in 1989 to take responsibility for the NEAP. Composed of seven civil servants, the unit was run on a day-to-day basis by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. He was supported by an expatriate technical adviser. The Guinean technical staff were not seconded full-time from their respective agencies. A further 80 civil servants were placed on monthly retainers to form 11 working groups for the preparation of thematic papers. This arrangement was changed in 1990 when the size of the groups was halved and a system of honoraria introduced for specific products. A core of regular short-term consultants was also used. The unit was disbanded in 1991.

Nepal NCS: At the height of activity during the NCS formulation phase (1985–88), the NCS secretariat comprised four technical experts, including an IUCN expatriate adviser, and four support staff. The NCS implementation programme secretariat, which began work in 1989, was built up in 1991 to 25 Nepalese technical staff, most with expertise in ecology, environmental management and environmental engineering, plus 20 support staff. The NCS programme director also heads the Environment Division within the National Planning Commission. He is supported by one IUCN expatriate adviser.

Pakistan NCS: An NCS secretariat was established in 1988 and housed in the Environment and Urban Affairs Division (EUAD) to manage the process leading to the preparation of an NCS document. IUCN, which was commissioned by the government of Pakistan to develop the NCS, hired a Canadian and a Pakistani as joint coordinators of the secretariat. Various other expatriate and Pakistani expert staff worked with the secretariat for extended periods in the drafting process. In addition, 18 experts, along with three or four peer reviewers were commissioned to prepare various background papers. The NCS secretariat was disbanded on completion of the strategy document in 1991. An NCS unit was set up in the EUAD 18 months later and IUCN continues to maintain an NCS support unit. The NCS unit is being significantly upgraded to coordinate implementation activities.

Uganda NEAP: The NEAP secretariat, established in 1991, includes 12 government officials, 12 academics and 2 members from the private sector, in addition to the regular use of Ugandan consultants. Initially some 70 Ugandan experts working in nine sectoral task forces were commissioned to prepare background papers and undertake the necessary consultations. In 1992, these task forces were reduced in size to some three members each. In 1992, three technical expatriate advisers joined the secretariat which works within the Environment Department of the Ministry of Water, Energy, Minerals, and Environmental Protection.

An important distinction between the NCS and NEAP processes relates to the start-up phase. The NEAP sequence is usually as follows:

The duration of the project is usually two years but can be as little as six months, as was the case in Nepal. Funding for the project is guaranteed once an agreement has been reached and then arrangements can be made to establish the secretariat and the steering committee. This commences the process of preparing the NEAP policy document and investment programme. Therefore, the start-up phase leading to the establishment of the NEAP management bodies is a fairly closed process between the donors and government and includes commitment of funding for the full plan preparation process.

NCSs make more of the start-up phase: it is regarded as a key opportunity to increase participants’ involvement in defining the approach to the strategy process. An initial agreement between the government and a technical support organization, usually UCN, has been limited to the preparation of a project proposal, or what has sometimes been called an NCS prospectus. The steering committee and the secretariat are established for that purpose. A commitment to funding has normally covered only this initial phase, which seldom extends beyond a year and may involve as little as six months. On the basis of feedback from this document, the government then decides on the most appropriate way to move forward into the main strategy process. Continuity in funding has been a problem at this point; often because less attention has been given to nurturing donor involvement in the start-up phase than has been the case with the NEAP process.

If a government decides that an NSDS or other multi-sectoral national strategy is feasible, an early task will be to establish the steering committee and secretariat. The focus of their initial meetings, involving wider groups of participants where necessary, will be:

On the basis of these initial discussions, the steering committee and secretariat should prepare the strategy proposal or prospectus. The main purpose of the prospectus is to help create an early understanding of the strategy and support for it. The participatory nature of the strategy can best be demonstrated and prepared for by allowing the prospectus to be worked on by a wide range of key potential participants for future phases of the process. Thoughtful participatory design at this stage may take more time but it is likely to save time later. In Pakistan, Nepal, Zambia, Canada and many other countries, the strategy proposal was widely circulated and formed the basis of public meetings and debate.

If the government has not set aside the necessary resources for long-term support of the strategy programme and if donors have not yet made a commitment to support anything beyond the start-up phase, then a key concern of the steering committee and secretariat during preparation of the strategy proposal will be to identify and make initial arrangements for the financing of future phases. In this respect, the prospectus should be reviewed as a funding proposal.

Start-up will need to be handled both diplomatically (to allay unnecessary fears about encroaching on rights and responsibilities) and with authority (to ensure that contributors treat the exercise with the attention that it deserves). The steering committee (and especially its chairperson) will need to be most active here. High-level seminars will be required to promote and explain the purpose of the strategy, and its likely benefits and implications. The seminars might involve the cabinet, permanent secretaries,
the legislative body, and leaders of major sectors outside government. They would aim to secure the required high-level and multi-interest support for the strategy, and would continue at various stages throughout the process.

Managing strategies requires a broad combination of skills. In the past, an emphasis has been placed on technical skills in those fields which are the substantive focus of the process. Access to such technical expertise is vital for the central structures in strategy management, the steering committee and secretariat. But strategy experience has shown that the wide range of inter-personal skills that establish and maintain the ‘circuitry’ for powering the strategy are more important to managing the process.

A number of strategy principles govern the management approach and skills required:

Most of these principles are concerned with people’s inter-actions with one another, their sense of efficacy and of control over the forces which shape their environment. They concern the way decisions are made and the commitment a strategy team can engender among key participants to the process, from the most senior politicians to the diversity of small community groups. Strategies for sustainable development require new forms of management that can respond to these principles and demands.

Another key determinant of strategy management requires an understanding from the outset that the processes are permanent. They are not one-time events but part of a cyclical process of planning and action, which enables lessons learned from defining and implementing the strategy to feed into refining, amending and improving it as circumstances and situations change. In this sense, strategies for sustainable development are best viewed as processes for managing change. Effective strategies rely on adaptive management. Many outcomes will be uncertain as individual preferences, social norms, ecological conditions, technological capabilities, and the state of development change over time.

Strategies are highly political processes that continue in times when governments are hard pressed and are susceptible to short-term pressures of all sorts. Managing strategies requires thinking strategically. Strategy teams need to take a long-term perspective, but there is little point in doing so if many of the most powerful participants pull out of the process because it has departed from day-to-day realities. As one of IUCN’s strategy network members in Latin America said at a recent network meeting:

‘Having a strategy is like playing chess, but not having a strategy is like rolling dice.’
Avecita Chicchón, Conservation International, Peru

		Updated 10 June, 2003